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RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN A WORLD IN CRISIS 





Francesc Serra Massansalvador 
3
 
Transition from the Putin administration to Medvedev took place, in a friendly way and 
with huge popular support, between December 2007 and March 2008. The parliamentary 
elections on December 7,
 2007 gave a landslide victory to the ruling party United Russia, 
with 64% of the vote and 306 of the 450 seats at stake. On March 2, 2008, a triumphant 
Dmitry Medvedev received 70% of the popular vote  in the presidential elections. 
Afterwards, and as announced beforehand, the outgoing President, Vladimir Putin, took 
office as the new Prime Minister. The highly-popular President Putin, who has never had 
to  face a runoff  election and to whom much of society attributes Russia's return to 
economic prosperity and national pride, solved in this way his continuity in power, since 
his withdrawal as President was required by the Constitution after exhausting a second 
consecutive term. Medvedev being then under close watch, few observers however could 
give  an accurate portrait of this 42 year-old politician, more linked to academic and 
intellectual circles than his predecessor, but had also been the all-powerful chairman of 
Gazprom, the strongly state-controlled company that shapes much of the internal and 
external policy of Russia. The new President insisted that he would keep the general lines 
of Putin's policy (“Putina”), a hardly suspicious statement, considering the long career 
undertaken by the two leaders together. However, everyone thought it unlikely that Putin, 
who had so reinforced the Russian presidency and had turned the Prime Ministry into 
little more than a technical office, would assume a secondary position. The polnomochiya 
or division of powers between the two positions was apparently scrupulously respected, 
but the charisma of the former President had not disappeared from people’s minds or the 
public sphere. This situation led in practice to the existence of an unprecedented tandem 
in Russian politics. Nevertheless, the inner image and, especially, the image abroad of 
Russian power had  changed substantially, at least in  principle. The differences in 
appearance (Medvedev looks more flexible and malleable, as compared to Putin’s more 
aggressive and assertive style) seemed to augur a more friendly, tolerant and receptive 
attitude of the new a administration. 
 
       One might say, however, that the plans established by this agreed-upon transition by 
the new President, especially in terms of Russian foreign policy, have been superseded by 
recent events. Medvedev's first year in the presidency coincided with a transformation of 
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the image of the international community at home, and more specifically a change in 
Russia’s  relationship with the world. From an  international point of view,  2008 was 
characterized by the start of the global financial crisis, by the final phase of the Bush era 
(with its own characteristics), and by the election of Obama as the new White House 
incumbent. From Moscow we perceive clear indications of Russia’s new positioning in 
the global arena  in the near  future,  due to  a series of  events that affect the country 
directly. In particular, 2008 and early  2009 brought forth  a number of unexpected 
challenges for the new Russian administration, which have created an image of Russia 
abroad that is far more aggressive than the one desired by the Kremlin. These unforeseen 
challenges can be grouped around three major events that placed severe conditions on 
Russia’s short-term foreign policy. These three key events strongly affecting Russia and 
its international relations during Medvedev’s first year of Presidency are 1. the conflict 
with Georgia, 2. the severe financial crisis, and 3. the renewed tensions seen in January 
2009 due to the supply of Russian oil and gas to Western Europe.  
          Below follows an analysis of Russia’s policy in relation to those areas considered 
as priority for its diplomacy: formerly Soviet territories, Western Europe, and the position 
of Russia as a world power. Finally, we will analyze the impact of the first year of 
Medvedev’s administration with regard to further Russian attitudes towards the 
international arena. 
 
The Georgian conflict: the limits of imprudence 
 
Perhaps Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili wanted to go down in history by 
choosing August 8
th, 2008 as the day when his country would regain sovereignty over 
some  territory internationally recognized as Georgian, but which lay  beyond  his 
governance  by a strange mixture  of forced agreements,  Russian blackmail,  and 
international  connivance. Perhaps he thought  that the world would be watching the 
opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games,  and  thus his actions  would  go 
unnoticed. More likely, he expected that the West would support his bold decision and 
would not allow Russia a strong response that could put into question international law. 
However, when Georgian forces shelled South Ossetia in preparation for the invasion, the 
result was not only  the  automatic reaction of the Russian army, but also  grave 
international tensions  in which Russia had to face, once again, the criticism of the 
international community. Despite Georgia’s argument, pointing out Russian rearmament, 
the truth is that Moscow reacted to the surprise attack with haste and little reflection, in a 
manner consistent with the reactive tone consistent with Russian diplomacy. Tiny, 
impoverished Georgia had to withdraw its troops and saw its own capital, Tblisi, under 
threat of a terrible occupation. At the same time, Ossetian and Abkhaz rebels, aided by 
the Russian offensive (or counteroffensive), advanced their own positions, and thousands 
of Georgian civilians suddenly became refugees. The West, in whose support Saakashvili 
had been  so  confident,  deployed its diplomatic apparatus, but not  with  the weapons 
Georgia was longing for, except for the late and ineffective landing of some NATO 
troops. 
Russia acted like a wounded bear,  and wanted to show consistency with the 
victimization speech acts, it had used in previous years, such as when referring to the 
case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia: should any foreign power intervene in areas under   5   
Russian influence, or populated by Russian citizens, the Kremlin would not hesitate to 
react according to its capabilities. Just months before Russia had angrily protested the 
international recognition of Kosovo. In a new argument, Russian diplomacy stated that if 
we allowed such a violation of international law in the Balkans, they would interpret it as 
a precedent applicable to the Caucasus. Hence to Moscow there was an internationally 
recognized precedent for applying the right of unilateral self-determination.  In their 
opinion this made the Georgian intervention an unacceptable interference.  
 The other bases, on which Russia supported its reaction, were the role of Russian 
“peace-keeping” forces as guarantors of the treaty of armistice for the area, signed in 
1992, and the alleged genocide being committed by Georgian forces. Of course, Tblisi 
should have denounced the treaty before its intervention, but the conditions, under which 
Georgia was constrained to accept it at that time, were far from friendly, in the midst of a 
civil war with rebel forces directly financed and armed by Moscow. On the other hand, it 
is hardly admissible that any international peacekeeping forces have the right to act with 
unlimited force, as claimed by the Kremlin. As for the argument (frequently used lately) 
of genocide as a justification for  one's actions  -  setting aside  for a moment  the 
controversial definition of this term – it could be argued that there was an “awareness 
campaign” circulating in the Russian media about the excesses committed by Georgian 
forces. Final accounts, including the ones made by the Russian media, provided much 
lower  figures  as to  the number of casualties and the  destruction  caused by Georgia 
(HRW, 2009). But the Russian military response did not wait for verification of the facts, 
hidden under the “war fog” as described by Clausewitz. And the argument that South 
Ossetians citizens have Russian passports, although true (Russia delivered thousands of 
them without prior warning years ago), raises important issues concerning the right of a 
State to protect its citizens beyond its borders. 
From a military point of view, Russia had it easy in the conflict: The simple fact 
that Georgia did not receive any strong international support is also a Russian victory. 
Both parties accepted the mediation of N. Sarkozy on behalf of the European Union, but 
the resulting "Treaty of the Six Points" implied asymmetric conditions, which clearly 
benefitted  Russia. However, the Kremlin has  not  shown much  of  triumph, and the 
aftertaste of defeat (or at least a lack of victory) is common to  all  parties involved 
(Antonenko, 2008). Russia agreed to withdraw from all occupied territory, and did so 
even  before the deadline set in the agreement. And  despite  the havoc  caused by 
recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Kremlin did not even 
press its staunchest allies for support on this initiative. Somehow, the bombastic language 
used during the conflict has significantly relaxed. Since then Russia recognized the need 
to resume a more flexible dialogue, especially after perceiving an position from the West 
(in particular  the European Union) not  likely to unconditionally support Georgian 
requests. 
However, the military adventure of August 2008  may have cost Russia much 
more than originally thought. True, the Kremlin has maintained a position of firmness 
and consistency; but this was at the expense of newly tense relations with the outside 
world, which  is not in Russia’s interest  to jeopardize. The armed response was, 
undoubtedly, an option Russia wishes to maintain. Once the need is produced, and an 
armed response  used,  the limits of  this option  become clear. Although  considering 
Russian interests, there was no other response to the reckless Georgian attack considered,   6   
unless a message of weakness would be conveyed. But both Russia and the West have 
realized along the way the need for greater communication and trust in order to avoid 
further imprudence and new excesses by both parties. 
 
The global crisis and its impact in Russia 
The fragility shown by Russia after its military victory in Georgia is only understandable 
if we consider the country’s social and economic situation. To "release" Ossetia or to take 
Tbilisi would not bring clear benefits to Russia from an economic point of view, much 
less from a political one. Instead, the country needs of trading partners, and a stable and 
reliable international image, after this was put into question by the Georgian adventure. 
In fact, 2008 was a very sensitive year for the Russian economy. While it is true that 
during  the first Putin  presidency  Russia depended excessively on the export of 
hydrocarbons, in recent years the country has tried to diversify its exports by 
"reindustrializing" itself. In any case, Russia needs the world to rely on its ability, either 
as a trading partner,  or as a country in which  to invest, and  therefore needs to be 
perceived  as  a peaceful country (an image, which the conflict in Georgia put  into 
question), and as economically sound (this has also been compromised). 
During the Putin era, Russia's economy continued to growth and project 
confidence. This was due largely to the stimulus of the (almost) continuous growth in oil 
prices. When Putin came to power in 2000, Russian GNP grew at a rate of 1%, and in 
2007 it was growing at 8% - although in 2008 this index dropped down dramatically: 
People living under the poverty line were 30% when Putin began the Presidency, and 
14% when he left. In 2007, Russia had the third largest reserve of foreign currency in the 
world, after USA and China. Russia had succeeded in 2006 to repay its debts with the 
IMF and  the Club of Paris (23 US$ billion) well in advance.  It  attracted  foreign 
investment of US$45  billion in 2007, almost double than  the previous year, while 
Russian investment overseas neared US$60 billion since 2000 (Sinatti, 2008; Tabata, 
2006). However, these optimistic trends appear to have led in 2008 and 2009 to a harsh 
economic reality,  not only due to the global crisis, but also due to  purely domestic   
factors. 
We can identify five major factors underlying the fragile situation of the Russian 
economy. First, Russia is experiencing a record stock market crisis that has forced several 
closures of the Moscow stock exchange; the latter has had a total loss of more than 70% 
of its value during 2008. Second, the military budget has been increased markedly since 
Medvedev’s  access to the presidency  at the expense of  increasingly necessary social 
spending. Third, inflation has soared dramatically,  to reach levels of 13%, when the 
official forecast was 8.5%. Fourth, the price of oil, one of the pillars of Russian economic 
growth, has fallen more than 50% in just a few months during the summer of 2008, and 
has kept steady but fragile afterwards. And finally, an impressive capital drain has taken 
place: an estimated 25% of foreign investment has left Russia during 2008 along, half of 
it  during the Georgian crisis. Some of these factors have been reinforced by the 
Caucasian conflict, while others are a reflection of global economic turmoil. All took 
place since early 2008, and have been increasing over the course of that year and the 
next.    7   
Hence Russia, which in February was being considered by the IMF as a world 
power with great growth prospects for the coming years, has been driven to an extremely 
fragile economic situation, endangering not only its global position, but also its internal 
stability. The Russian economy experienced 5.6% growth in 2008, already leaving behind 
the excellent figures of the previous years, but in 2009  growth was negative: -5% 
according to IMF data. While economic breakdown was common to many developed 
countries due to the global crisis,  the Russian recovery seems to be very slow: the 
projected growth of the Russian GDP for 2010 is only 4%, and the IMF-forecast for 2011 
is even lower at 3.3%. GDP per capita in Russia, which reached a peak of US$ 11,700 in 
2008, dropped to US$ 8,700 in 2009, and it is not expected to reach the 2008 peak before 
2011. 
Of course, the evolution of the global economy brings reason for optimism, but it 
is clear that the prospects are not so good for a non-stabilized economy like Russia. On 
other occasions (1992, 1998) international economic institutions, mainly the IMF and the 
European Union, have  come to the aid of the  Russian economy in need of external 
support. In the current crisis, that aid is complicated by the existence of a global crisis 
that has strained the capacity of these institutions to  provide assistance to every 
emergency situation, many of them in the area of Russian influence. As a result, Russia 
faces the most recent and, simultaneously, the most persistent historical ghosts: poverty. 
At the mercy of the global economic recovery, Russia needs to urgently stabilize its own 
growth and to recover the confidence not only of investors and foreign politicians, but 
also, and above all, of its citizens. 
 
The gas crisis: a crisis of confidence 
 
In January 2009, two serious problems occurred with the distribution of Russian gas to 
Western Europe, originating in the new energy contracts concluded between Russia and 
Ukraine. Gazprom, the Russian oil and gas company, aimed to collect US$2.1 billion 
owed  it  by its  Ukrainian counterpart, Naftogaz,  and at the same time seeking to 
reevaluate its energy supply prices. When Kiev was subjected to these new gas prices, 
they could barely cope with them (although they were relatively discounted by a ratio of 
1 to 2.5, compared with international rates), and tensions rose sharply with the supplier, 
Gazprom, and the state behind it, Russia. Moscow accused Ukraine of "stealing" gas and 
"obstructing" a supply plant, causing outages in Western Europe. In retaliation, it decided 
to cut the international pipe lines passing through Ukraine. As a result, several European 
countries, especially in the Balkans, Hungary and Turkey,  were severely affected, 
because their energy supply, both for industrial and for domestic purposes, depends on 
Russian gas supplies via Ukraine. Through that pipe line, as much as 80% of all Russian 
gas is exported to Europe. This led to a real humanitarian crisis in the affected countries 
in the middle of a hard winter, with a severe economic crisis in the making. This was not 
the first occasion in which such problems occurred, however we witness every winter  
some equivalent situation, in which politicians and European societies are compelled to 
rethink  their energy dependence on Russia. The debate usually focuses on whether it is 
necessary to remove the obstacles encountered by Russian gas to reach Europe or, on the 
contrary,  whether  the dependence on Russian oil and gas should  be abandoned  by   8   
diversifying Europe’s energy supply. Once again energy supply routes were front-page 
news as an issue of strategic importance for Europe. 
Russia is also using a Northern pipeline (Yamal), which delivers gas mostly to 
Germany and Poland via Belarus and the Baltic. A third route is the Blue Stream pipeline, 
which crosses the Black sea in the direction of Turkey. In the future, there are plans to 
build the Nabucco pipeline, which will connect Turkey and Central Asia with Austria, 
and to strengthen the Yamal pipeline in order to cross the Baltic Sea without passing 
through any intermediate countries. But while the first project is generally interpreted as a 
threat to Russian interests, the Yamal is strongly supported by Gazprom and the Kremlin. 
There are also several other projects that try to diversify energy supply by creating 
pipelines to Algerian and Libyan gas, such as Galsi and Transmed, supported by Italy, 
and Medgaz, funded by Spanish companies (Sagers, 2007). 
The gas crisis ended after a few days, largely due to pressure from the European 
Union, but the underlying problem persists. It is no longer true that Europeans prefer a 
"Christian Orthodox" rather than a "Muslim" source of energy (Moisi, 2005). They want 
to have a reliable source that does not threaten the economic growth and welfare of 
European countries. In this context, Russia accuses Europe of mistrust: only such distrust 
may be behind energy route projects such as the BTC  (Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, 
whose purpose is to transport gas and oil from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia by 
bypassing Russia),  and the Nabucco  pipeline  (which favor Ukraine and Turkey as 
alternative energy routes). Several observers, and entire sectors in Europe (Loskot, 2005), 
however, have reciprocally accused Moscow of bad faith, and desiring to ensure energy 
blackmail,  after  attracting  Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to its interests through  the 
Turkmenbashi treaty of 2006 (which ensures priority supply of Central Asian gas to 
Russia), as this deviates gas from the path that would lead to Baku and from there to 
Western Europe. The gas crisis of 2009 has put these suspicions on the table - and also 
the common Western will to overcome them. As Europe’s energy needs and Russia’s 
need to sell it represent convergent interest among them, these periodic crises only hurt 
both sides. 
In this regard, it should be noted that, contrary to some perceptions in Europe, the 
Russian economy suffers from excessive, even uncomfortable, dependence on  energy 
exports,  with clear ramifications for its  national  policy. According to  International 
Energy Agency 2008  data, Europe received some 30% of its energy supplies  from 
Russia, while hydrocarbons account for about 70% of all Russian exports to the European 
Union, with the energy sector representing 25% of Russian GDP. This lack of proportion 
is even more highlighted by the presence of the state holding Gazprom, which alone 
accounts for 8% of Russian GDP. This company is currently under significant control of 
the Russian government, to the point of where one might  even  speak of an 
interconnection between it and the Russian government, even leading them to alternate 
their leaders. This practice stems from the Yeltsin era, when the company founder, V. 
Chernomyrdin, served for a long time as Prime Minister (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005; 
Milov, V. et al., 2006). Medvedev also  left the presidency of the gas group  for the 
presidency of the Russian Federation, and was replaced at Gazprom by former Prime 
Minister V. Zubkov. The weight of this company in the economy and Russian politics is 
obvious, and as a result much Russian foreign policy is decided at Gazprom headquarters. 
As this company is interested in selling, particularly to Europe, it needs a good neighbor   9   
policy that promotes trade, and avoids further misunderstandings and tensions, for the 
sake of the Russian economy, the welfare of its citizens—and corporate profits (Balzer, 
2005).  
 
Russia and Europe, forced to agree 
 
The  foregoing  leads us to ponder  the importance of relations between both  parts of 
Europe as a mutually beneficial project. The crises experienced in recent years have 
shown a new paradigm in relation to others with previous periods of tension between 
Moscow and Brussels: there is now a  desire for overcoming misunderstandings 
immediately, and for maintaining privileged relations between both powers, regardless of 
the other smaller players’ interests. In the past two decades, the crises between Europe 
and Russia  were deep and serious; in the two interventions in1994 and 1999, which 
Russia made in Chechnya Europe denounced what were considered violations of human 
rights and  excessive  use of force.  Russia, meanwhile, viewed these concerns as 
unacceptable interference, the result of mistrust and an implicit desire to limit Russia's 
actions, not only in the international field, but even in its own area of sovereignty.  
          Later, in 2004 the European Union, submerged in serious internal divisions over 
the European Constitution and U.S. operations in Iraq, reacted equivocally to the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine. The leader of the revolution, V. Yushchenko sent a message of 
hope to Ukrainian society about early accession to European institutions, which these 
institutions were unable to deny, causing outrage in Moscow and a crisis of confidence 
that took time to be repaired. What for some Europeans (especially in the East) meant the 
defense of citizens' rights and the  sovereignty of States, represented  for Russia new 
interference over their sphere of influence: Russia felt that it could claim its rightful 
status as a regional power, as well as traditional links to the surrounding area. There were 
often accusations of manipulation of public opinion and imperialism, which deepened the 
gap and mutual mistrust. This position is often fueled by the historic distrust felt by the 
countries of Eastern Europe that,  until two decades ago,  saw Russia limiting  their 
sovereignty and freedom. Thus, in May 2001, the then President of the Czech Republic, 
V. Havel, stated in front of the candidates for NATO membership (the "Vilnius Ten") 
that  he was convinced that Russia, not being a country either  Western or European, 
should not receive special treatment from Western organizations. When, under the 
Obama administration, the U.S. proposed the withdrawal of the anti-missile defensive 
shield project, over twenty former presidents, prime ministers and ministers of foreign 
affairs from Eastern Europe expressed their concern publicly. 
This dynamic of misunderstandings and accusations contrasts vividly with the 
intensification of economic ties between both ends of the continent. Today, Russia is a 
major trading partner for the European Union, while  the European Union is by far 
Russia’s first economic partner. These bonds of interdependence are extremely strong: 
over  60% of Russian exports go to EU; of these exports, more than half are 
hydrocarbons. Russia supplied the EU about 32% of its oil and 42% of its gas imports in 
2007. Similarly, the EU represented about 40% of Russian imports; overall, Russia is the 
third largest trading partner of the EU, after the U.S. and China, with 6.2% of EU exports 
and 10.4% of imports, according to European Commission data. The main exporters to 
Russia in the European Union are Germany (32%), Italy (10.6%), Finland (8.6%),  10   
Netherlands (7.6%) and France (6.5%), while the main importers of Russian products are 
Germany (20.6%), Netherlands (12.1%), Italy (9.6%), Poland (6.9%) and UK (5.6%). 
This data serves to draw a geography of European countries according to their 
relationship and dependence on Russia, a geography that becomes visible in every crisis 
between the European Union and Russia, and which has been repeated in recent tensions 
around Georgia and the gas. Thus, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, having strong 
commercial ties with Moscow, form a kind of pro-Russian lobby, ready to appease the 
wrath of other, mainly smaller, weaker countries from Eastern Europe (specially Poland, 
Lithuania and the Czech Republic), which feel threatened by the energy dependence or 
by the Russian giant's strategic projects. France, with its historical ties to Moscow, would 
be the traditional mediator in times of crisis, while Britain, with its marked Atlanticist 
policy  and  low energy dependency on Russia, tends to keep its distance from the 
Kremlin. This is reflected in the EU’s complicated power geometry: countries interested 
in maintaining good relations with Moscow are usually the most powerful, while the most 
committed to an anti-Russian front are the Eastern countries, not very influential, but 
whose inexperience led them in 2004 to endanger the EU joint position with their militant 
attitude in favor of the Ukrainian nationalism. Despite demonstrating their belligerent 
position again during the recent crisis (and thus Baltic and Polish leaders, along with the 
Ukrainian President, visiting Tbilisi during the Georgian crisis), these countries often 
maintain now a more moderate attitude with respect to Russian actions and, above all, 
coordinate  their  own  actions with the European Union to avoid further friction, as 
recently highlighted by the Russian president himself (Medvedev, 2008).  
Russia and Europe have traditionally viewed each other with caution, though with 
a desire for closer relations. It has been stated variously (Fischer, 2009) that the treatment 
which the West accords Russia ranges between the "difficult partner" and the "strategic 
adversary". Still, despite periodic tensions, it is now clear that an eventual confrontation 
between Russia and Europe would be highly detrimental to both, and is thus carefully 
avoided. On the contrary, there is a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, establishing 
a highly ambitious framework for cooperation between the two parties. It is so complete 
as to be unmatched by any other agreement reached  between the EU and any non-
candidate country (Lynch, 2003). While it is true that this agreement was difficult to 
adopt (signed in 2004, it was not ratified until 2007 due to the Chechen crisis), it is also 
true that, after over two years past its expiration, the Agreement remains unchanged 
because of the difficulties in negotiating a new text. Yet both sides agree on the need to 
stress  their  cooperation  regardless of  political difficulties, as demonstrated by the 
strengthening of economic relations in recent years. This  trend  seems to have been 
facilitated also by the EU’s attitude shown with respect to the Georgian as well as the gas 
crises, an attitude closer to appeasement than to confrontation.  
 
Is there an area of Russian regional influence? 
 
One of the main issues that regularly make Russia confront other powers, as we have 
seen, is the definition of a Russian regional sphere of influence. In the latest crises in 
Georgia and pertaining to gas exports this concept was implicit, as well as, of course, in 
previous  crises around the "color revolutions" of 2003 and 2004. Essentially, Russia 
claims to have regional leadership based on three central ideas: a) the traditional ties of  11   
these countries with Russia (and thus the claim that it is the will of much of their societies 
to maintain those links); b) the nature of Russia as a "great power", something which, in 
their view, would allow Russia to sustain a particular influence over all geographically 
closer countries, as any other great power would; and c) the complementarity of the 
Russian economy to the markets and raw materials of these countries. We must add one 
important symbolic element, connected with the first concept: the majority of Russian 
people (and most of the other societies involved) still consider the Russian historical 
space (i.e.  the former Tsarist Empire,  the  former  USSR) as their primary identity 
reference.  Therefore, any denial  or threat to Russian influence on this area is to be 
considered a "national" affront and an "unnatural" attitude (Massie, 2001). 
In this context, the “color revolutions” in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) 
could  be  interpreted largely  as  an  interference, or perhaps a conspiracy against the 
legitimate interests of Russia. The pusillanimous  attitude  of the EU during  these 
revolutions was seen, at best, as a lack of sensitivity, in the worst case, as a betrayal 
(Schmidtke & Yekelchyk, 2008). In the most recent crises, however, the European Union 
seems to have learned its lessons, and it has carefully avoided provoking Russia. The 
wishes of Georgia and (to a lesser extent) Ukraine to get closer to the West have not 
received the same level of support as on previous occasions. In fact, the solution to these 
crises was brought in both cases by ignoring Georgian and Ukrainian demands. These 
two  countries have learned a harsh lesson that  despite  their  strong political will,  the 
support from their populations (especially in Georgia), and the apparent legitimacy of 
their demands, their governments should refrain from acting unilaterally. Western Europe 
does not want to  damage its  good relations with Russia,  which  have such profitable 
results, at the whims of some much less productive and influential countries.  
As for the Russian sphere of influence itself, it  suffers from chronic 
disorganization. Russian media often refer to the historical space referred to above as the 
"near abroad", in order to make it  coincide with the former USSR. Since the Baltic 
countries  have broken  any links with Moscow, the twelve remaining republics were 
coupled in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, this community 
has failed as such in its most basic aspirations, and it works just like a regular summit 
meeting of their leaders. In addition, Turkmenistan and Ukraine recently announced their 
desire to exit into observer status within the CIS (a status not recognized by the CIS 
charter),  while  Georgia  left  the organization altogether in August 2009.  Lacking  any 
organizational cohesion, Russia continues to exert its control over the CIS area by means 
of specialized treaties concluded among groups of states through complex, aggressive, 
and coercive diplomacy (Trenin, 2008), and above all, by the existence of an international 
consensus that implicitly tolerates that control. 
The latest events happened in 2009 bring about some contradictory prospects: on 
the one hand, Ukraine seemed to overcome the effects of the 2004 Orange Revolution, 
and the Russophile Viktor Yanukovich was elected as the new President. The new 
agreements reached by Yanukovich with Russia on the energy and strategic fields may 
announce a period of apparent peace and stability in the region; but Ukraine is far from 
having reached any political and social consensus on the issue of the Russian influence. 
In any case, both the EU attitude of ignoring Ukrainian claims for joining European 
institutions, and the rampant economic crisis in the country were crucial for this political 
change to happen. On the other hand, in 2009 we witnessed some interesting steps in  12   
Moldova, Central Asia, and Armenia tending to skip, or at least dilute the overwhelming 
Russian influence in those areas, usually by seeking closer links to the European Union 
and other Western European organizations, mainly on economic and energy grounds. As 
a general conclusion, we can say that the Russian regional influence area is far from 
consolidated, but that  Western institutions will hardly make any substantial move to 
promote their presence in the area. 
 
Russia in the world 
 
Since its new foundation in 1991, Russia has struggled to maintain its status as a great 
power,  and  at  the same time  maintain  a  happy coexistence with other  powers.  This 
arrangement, however, has not always been easy, as the latest crises have demonstrated. 
We have witnessed the complexity of the relations between Russia and the European 
Union, which are mostly governed by a spirit of mutual cooperation. Relations with the 
United States, however, present some particularities that make dialogue between the two 
powers frankly difficult and tense. It should be noted, however, that in the final phase of 
the mandates of Bush and Putin, both leaders had reassumed a level of confrontation that 
not long ago seemed a thing of the past. After a meeting in November 2001between the 
two leaders in Texas, there was a period of fruitful collaboration, undoubtedly due to a 
matching vision of the world that privileged security and the fight against terrorism. At 
that level of understanding, we saw examples of collaboration, such as during the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan, Russia's "constructive opposition" to the invasion of Iraq, or the 
participation of both powers in the "Quartet" to find solutions to the Middle East conflict.  
           But tensions between Moscow and Washington soon reappeared,  something 
apparently inevitable, given the privileged nature that security matters mean on both their 
agendas. Following a gradual rise in tension, four basic issues can be found in 2008 that 
provoked confrontation between Russia and the United States and, by extension, between 
Russia and NATO: a) at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, the Alliance approved 
the installation of the missile shield in Poland and Czech Republic, a decision that Russia 
considered an affront; b) at the same summit, the U.S. supported Georgia and Ukraine's 
candidacy for membership in the Alliance. Although this application did not materialize 
as yet due to European opposition, Washington adopted a clear speech of acceptance of 
these candidates, that was detrimental to the interests and sensitivities of Russia; c) in 
what may be interpreted as perhaps the most daring act of provocation to Russia since the 
Cold War, U.S. supported independence for the Serbian region of Kosovo. Although it is 
true that most EU countries  did the same, Moscow saw  this  move  as an Atlanticist 
maneuver seeking Russian diplomatic marginalization; and d) during the Georgian crisis, 
the U.S. diplomatic support for Tbilisi forced OSCE and NATO to take position in the 
conflict,  and  managed to make the Alliance land some  weaponry  on behalf of  the 
Georgian government, soon after the military phase of the conflict was over. 
This confrontation of Russia with the United States is not new, and it reflects the 
distinction Russia makes between “the friendly West with whom we can work” (i.e. the 
EU) and “the hostile West with whom mutual threats can arise” (i.e. NATO) (Serra, 
2005, p. 223-35; Smirnov, 2002). However, even if there is no such economic 
dependence with America as there is with the EU, Russia is aware of the need for a 
common understanding between the two powers. Since the Georgian crisis, the Kremlin  13   
knows it cannot afford any more confrontation, or even to prolong what has been called 
Russian "capability to act as a nuisance" (Moisi, 2006). On the other hand, Moscow can 
no  longer  use  the  threat of having  an "Asian”  backing, as Yeltsin did periodically, 
especially  with  Primakov  as Foreign Affairs Minister  (Duncan, 2005). Following the 
Georgian crisis, Russia only managed to obtain ambiguous support from China under the 
Treaty of Shanghai—far from the clear alignment that was no doubt expected. Other 
international support for its  actions  was  scarce  and predictable (Belarus, Venezuela, 
Cuba), and thus far only tiny Nicaragua has recognized the “new states” of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, existing only under the protection of Russia. The Kremlin maintains an 
independent foreign policy and this independence has allowed it for example, to maintain 
an extensive trade with Iran, or to sign military treaties with Cuba and Venezuela. At the 
same time, its position of engaging into multilateralism and condemning United States 
actions has led Russia to maintain closer contacts with other emerging powers, such as 
Brazil or India (Donaldson & Nogee, 2005). 
In brief, Russia wants to maintain its own weight in the world, and to keep the 
ability to exert particular influence over weaker countries while talking as an equal with 
the  biggest powers. However, Russia  is aware of its structural weaknesses in an 
increasingly interdependent world economy (Cooper, 2006), and knows that it cannot 
have a position of leadership beyond the region, which is commonly attributed as its 
natural expansion area - sometimes, as discussed above - not even in that region. Russia 
is growing increasingly aware that it needs to become involved in global economic and 
political strategies, as it is true that Russia is still the object of great distrust to Western 
actors. But Russia equally must overcome its own doubts and distrust towards the outside 
world, so that it can generate a feeling of reliability. The last two years have provided 
serious lessons in this regard. Let us hope that the lessons learned and the experience 
gained, coupled with the current international situation of economic crisis, may lead to a 
new scenario of cooperation and dialogue. 
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